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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH in the
interest of
KENNETH EUGENE MARQUEZ

Case No.
14571

A person under eighteen
years of age.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Th€' oppellant, Kenneth Eugene Marquez, appeals from
an Qr,Jr'r of lhe Second District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, dated April 12, 1976, committing Mr.
Marquez, a juvenile, to the Utah State Industrial School.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming the
decision and order rendered by the Juvenile Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 2, 1975, Mr. John G. Cowan left his
home at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
windows and doors were secure.

When he left, all

On his return at approximately
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9: 00 p.m., he discovered that the back door had been forceci
open, the garage window had been punched out and several
On November 3, 197 5, Officer

items of value were missing.

Thompson of the Salt Lake City Police Department observed
what appeared to be fingerprints on the garage window, and
he requested that they be processed by the Police Crime
Lab.

On November 4, 1975, Officer Simpson lifted the print;

from the window, and later conclusively identified the prin:
as belonging to the appellant.

A trial was held on March H

1976, where the appellant offered no evidence in his own
behalf.

Judge Regnal W. Garff, Jr., found the

allegat~m

of burglary and theft true beyond a reasonable doubt, and
ordered the cippellant committed to the Utah State Industria:
School.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE FINGERPRINT RECORDS OF THE ACCUSED WITHOUT REQUIRr
THAT A FOUNDATION BE LAID TO SHOW 'rHAT SUCH FINGERPRINTS
WERE OBTAINED IN COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH STATUTORY PROVISIONS
AND JUVENILE COURT RULES.
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-116

(1953), provides that

"Without consent of the [juvenile court]

judge, no fingerpr

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shall be taken of any child taken into custody.

"

Appellant asks this Court to adopt rules of law which
would require the State to lay a foundation showing
compliance with the above statute before fingerprint
evidence may be admitted in evidence in a juvenile court
proceeding.

Appellant has asserted that such a rule is

the only means available to enforce the statute, and
that in the absence of a sufficient foundation, the
evidence must be conclusively presumed to have been
illegally obtained.

Appellant's argument is premised

on the notion that fingerprint evidence obtained in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-116 (1953), as
amended, would be inadmissible in court proceedings.
Respondent respectfully submits that the adoption of
the above rule on such reasoning would be unwise,
unnecessary and

co~trary

to public policy.

Appellant has admitted that there is no recognized
case law on this subject, but has quoted Davis v. Mississippi,

394 U.S. 721 (1969), in support of the proposition that
fingerprint evidence obtained illegally is inadmissible in
a state court.

More precisely stated, the holding in that

case is that a suspect may not be detained in violation of
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the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and that fingerprint evidence obtained as a
result of that illegal detention is "tainted" and inadmissible.

The Court did not hold that the taking of fingerprin

was a search or seizure subject to Fourth Amendment limitations, and specifically found "no occasion in this case ..

to determine whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendmen

could be met by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtain·
ing, during the course of a criminal investigation, the
fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable
cause to arrest."

Davis at 728.

It has been held that

absent an illegal detention, there is no basis for objecting
to the admission of fingerprint evidence.
447 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1971).

Redd v. Decker,

Voluntary submission to

fingerprinting has been held a waiver of any Fourth Amendmer
rights,

People v. Hannaman, 507 P.2d 466

(Colo. 1973), and

it has been held that fingerprints may be taken absent a
warrant or arrest,
553

(1970).

State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d

Despite the slim authority available for the

proposition that fingerprints are subject to Fourth Arnendme
protections, appellant contends that fingerprint evidence
should not be admitted even if it is obtained by procedures
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that comport with constitutional commands.
urging that Utah Code Ann.

§

Appellant is

55-10-116 (1953), supplies

an additional and independent ground for the exclusion of
evidence.

Such a rule would be analogous to the present

"exclusionary rule" only in its draconian effect of denying
to the courts relevant evidence.

The rule would be based

not on the requirements of constitutional construction, but
rather on implication from the statute, and it is a hazardous
guess at best that the legislature would have afforded juveniles
the protection found in the statute at the cost of allowing
juvenile offenders to escape punishment.

Fashioning a rule

as pr,1yed for by appellant would constitute an unwarranted
incur:;ion into the legislative sphere.
Contrary to appellant's contention, an exclusionary
rule

JS

not the only, or even the best, means of enforcing

Utah Code Ann.

§

55-10-116 (1953).

A juvenile who felt

that his fingerprints had been unlawfully taken or filed
should be able to bring an action to compel destruction of
the record.

Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157

(1972); Eddy v. Moore, 5 wash.App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971);
and Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. 1970).

Such an

an action would be analogous to a proceeding to restore
property improperly seized under a warrant.

Utah Code Ann.
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§

77-54-18

(1953).

This procedure would give a remedy to

all juveniles wrongfully fingerprinted, not just to those
returned to court under suspicion of misbehavior; but it
would not forbid a court to receive relevant evidence.

A

process for destruction of records under court order would
also have a greater deterrent effect on official misconduct
than an exclusionary rule.

Under an exclusionary rule, the

police could keep an illegally obtained set of

fingerpri~s

for comparison purposes, obtain probable cause for an arm:
from those fingerprints, and then take an admissible set of
prints at th<' time of the arrest.

It is precisely this typ,

of c i i-cular procedure which led Justice Stewart to characte:
the [}avis decision as a "useless gesture."

Davis at 730.

The conviction in the Davis case was eventually affirmed,
see Davis v. State, 255 So.2d 916
409 U.S. 855 (1972).

(Miss. 1971), cert.~

See also Bynum v. United States, 262

F.2d 465 (D.C. 1959), and 274 F.2d 767

(D.C. 1960).

T~

harmful effects of a rule that excludes relevant evide~e
from a court proceeding has long been recognized.

As Chief

Justice Burger said:
"The history of the suppression doctrine
demonstrates that it is both conceptually
sterile and practically ineffective in
,
accomplishing its stated objective. · · ·
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Ag~~
403 U.S. 388, 415 (1970).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has resisted efforts to
expand the scope of the exclusionary rule.

See Stone v.

Powell, 44 U.S.L.W. 5313 (U.S. July 6, 1976), holding that
where a state has provided a full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, a convict is not entitled to
federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds of an unconstitutional search; United States v. Jains, 44 U.S.L.W.
5303 (U.S. July 6, 1976), holding that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to forbid the use in the civil proceedings
of one sovereign the evidence seized by an agent of another
sovereign.

State court decisions have been consistent with

this trend to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule,
i.e., People v. Coleman, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024
(1975), stating that the exclusionary rule is not applicable
to parole revocation hearings.
In addition to expanding the substantive scope
of the exclusionary rulP, appellant has urged its adoption
in an ,·entirely one-sided procedural framework.

Ordinarily,

a criminal defendant cannot require a prosecutor to "lay a
foundation" to show that all evidence that he intends to
admit was legally obtained.

Evidence obtained in violation

of constitutional rights is kept out of court by means of
0

motion to suppress, and the defendant has the burden of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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showing a prima facie case of unreasonable search and
seizure to support his motion.
Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25

United States v.

(N.D. Cal. 1955); People v.

Manning, 33 Cal.App. 586, 109 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1973); and
People v. Valdez, 173 Colo. 410, 480 P.2d 574 (1971).
As this Court said in State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d
38, 414 P.2d 958 (1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 939:
"Evidence is suppressed or
excluded only if the same was obtained
by a violation of the Fourth Amendment
. . • Therefore it is entirely proper
to require of one who seeks to challenge
the legality of a search as a basis for
suppressing relevant evidence that he
alleges, and if the allegation be disputed, that he establish that he himself
was a victim of an invasion of privacy."
In the present case, the appellant has not produced a
scintilla of evidence that the fingerprint record was
obtained in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-116 (1953)
There are, in fact, indications that the fingerpr
record was obtained in 0n entirely legal fashion.

The

fingerprint card is dated as having been made on June 20,
19 7 3.

The rule governing the taking of f ingerpr in ts at th

time was General Order No. 3, Rule 39, Utah Juvenile court
Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provided:

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the
Judges of the Utah State Juvenile
Court that duly appointed and acting
law enforcement officers in the State
of Utah may take the fingerprints of
any person under the age of eighteen
years, which such officer has lawfully
taken into custody:
1. When such person has committed
one of the following acts:
(a) Any offense which would be a
felony if committed by an adult.
(b)
Any offense that would be
petit larceny if committed by an adult.
(c) Any offense of depriving a
motor vehicle owner of possession.
(d)
Any offense involving a
sexual exhibition.
(e)
Running away from home without
the consent of parents or guardian.
2.
In any other case when such
person has been lawfully taken into
custody upon sufficient evidence tending
lo connect said person with the commission
of an offense that would be a crime if
committed by an adult, and fingerprints
are reasonably necessary for comparison
with latent prints obtained at the crime
scene to further establish that said person
perpetrated the offense or that he is innocent
of the offense."

The fingerprint card indicates that it was taken incident to
an arrest for "Auto Theft" and "Run A-way," and is clearly
within the above rule.

The later rule which requires the

destruction of records of arrest not resulting in action
by the court, U.J.C.R.P.P. Rule 39

(1975), was not in effect

at the time the fingerprint record was made, and according

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to accepted rules of construction, it should not be given
a retroactive interpretation so as to require the destruction of records already filed.

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3

(1953).
The fact that the record was in official

cust~y~

was not destroyed gives rise to the presumption that the
officers were under no duty to destroy it.

Contrary to

appellant's contention, where the record is silent, officers
are conclusively presumed to have performed their duty.
Utah Liquor Control Comm' n v. District Court of the Seventr.
Judicial District, 100 Utah 135, 111 P.2d 144 (1941);
People v_

Co~Jins,

172 Cal.App.2d 295, 342 P.2d 370 (1959):]

and f'aint_er v_. Peyton, 257 F.Supp. 913 (E.D. Virginia 1966).
As this Court has said, ".

.

. peace officers shoul'

not be unduly hampered in legitimate attempts to investigate
crimes and to seek out and identify those who have corrm1itte:
them."

State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (19721.

Exclusion of fingerprint evidence in this case would clearli,
hamper police activity without providing a corresponding
benefit.

For the reasons stated above, respondent

respectfully submits that the Juvenile Court committed
no error in the admission of the fingerprint evidence.
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POINT II
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER
OF LAW IN ADMITTING FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE AS AN EXCEPTION
TO THE HEARSAY RULE.
Appellant contends that fingerprint evidence
is inadmissible hearsay unless authenticated by the
officer who made the record, and has cited People v.
Zirbes, 6 Cal. 2d 425, 57 P.2d 1319 (1936) as authority.
However, it is no longer the law of California that
fingerprint records are inadmissible as hearsay.
People v. Crosslin, 251 Cal. App. 968, 60 Cal. Rptr.
309 (1967).

That court held fingerprint cards ad-

missible under the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act.

In almost every American jurisdiction,

properly authenticated fingerprint records are
admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
P.2d 847

Brown v. People,124. Colo. 412, 238

(1951); State v. Morris, 222 La. 480, 620

So. 2d G4CJ

(1953);

Brown v. State, 413 S.W. 2d 922

(Tex. C£im. 1967); State v. Gagallarritti, 377 S.W.
2d 298

(Mo. 1964); State v. O'Neal, 204 Kan. 226,

461 P.2d 801 (1969); Plunkett v. State, 437 P.2d
92 (Nev. 1968).

This court has held police "rap

sheets" admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule.
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Price v. Turner, 28 U.2d 328, 502 P.2d 121 (1972).
The fingerprint card as offered in evidence satisfied the requirements of both the business records
exception to the hearsay rule URE 63(13), and the
reports of persons exclusively authorized exception
URE 63(16).

Statutory authorization for making

fingerprints is found in Utah Code Annotated
§§
§

77-59-9, 77-59-29

(1953).

Utah Code Annotated

77-59-26 provides that:
"Any copy of a . . . fingerprint . . • in the files of the
bureau (of criminal identification)
certified by the director to be
a true copy of the original, shall
be admissible in evidence in any
court of this state in the same
manner as the original might be."

This necessarily implies that original fingerprint
records are admissible without direct testimony
by the officer who made them.
As Dean Wi';i'10re has said:
"'Ilic purpose and reason of the
hears--1y rule is the key to the exceptions to it.
'Ile theory of the hearsay rule
is that the many possible sources
of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness
which may lie underneath the bare
untested assertion of a witness
can best be brought to light and
exposed, if they exist, by the

-12-
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test of cross-examination. But
this test or security may in a
given instance be superfluous;
it may be sufficiently clear, in
that instance, that the statement
offered is free enough from the
risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that the test of crossexamination would be a work of
supererogation." 5 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1420 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
In applying this testto firgerprint records, the
following result is obtained:
"In evidencing the identity
of a party to the case with some
other person, how may fingerprint records kept elsewhere be
evidenced? .
. the official record
of such prints, kept under authority
express or implied, is admissible,"
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 414a (3d.
Ed. 1940)
Respon<1cnt respectfully submits that the juvenile
coud ''.; adrnission of the fingerprint record as an
excr'11tion
and

lo

the hearsay rule was based on sound

recogni~cd

principles of law, and as such

constituted no error.
POINT III
A SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THE
ADMISSION OF THE FINGERPRINT RECORD AS AN EXCEPTION
TO THE HEARSAY RULE.
Appellant has cited two Utah cases which
demonstrate the proper rule as to the foundational
requirement for the admission of evidence under
the

I
............_

business records exception to the hearsay rule.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

State v. Davie, 121 Utah 189, 240 P.2d 265 (1952)
and Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 96
Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819

(1938).

Appellant has correctly

isolated the elements of a proper foundation from
these cases:

the records must be made "in the

usual course of business", they must be "generally
authenticated", they must be introduced

from

proper custody, and there must be a showing of
necessity for the introduction of the evidence without requiring the person who made the print to
testify.

Appellant has not indicated which of these

foundational requirements he feels is unsatisfied.
Officer Simpson testified that he was employed as
a finqerpri11t
fin-1•'t"!'':i111

technician for six years (T.15), that

1·,:.irds are made during the regular course

of "busine:;,;" at the Salt Lake City Police Department
(T.17), that these cards are filed under the "Henry
System" at the Police Departments Identification
Bureau, that he recognized the card introduced
as Exhibit #1 as a card used at the Police Department, and that he obtained the card from the Fingerprint File (T.18,19).

Such testimony is sufficient

to satisfy the requirements that the record be made
in the regular course of business, and that it be
generally authenticated.

In Norchcrest Inc. v.

Walker Bank & Trust Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2J
692 (1952), this court held that a bank officer
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was competent to testify as to bank records and
their contents, even though he was not associated
with the bank until some years after the transaction
in question had occurred.

The fact that he was

familiar with bank records made concurrent with
the transaction was sufficient to qualify him
as a witness.

The witness testified that the

fingerprint card was obtained from the files
of the Salt Lake City Police Department.

This

is sufficient to establish proper custody, and
a fingerprint technician is competent to testify
a~

a custodian.

52, 58-SS

Lester v. State, 416 P.2d

(Okla. Crim. 1966).

When a fingerprint

record has been produced from official custody, a
sufficient foundation has been laid for its admission.
State v. Polson, 93 Idaho 912, 478 P.2d 292 cert.
denied 402 U.S. 930

(1971).

Tlte appro: ,- ia te degree of necessity required
to be slln1-:n in or, . ·r Lo admit a record made under
an expt-c'sc; statut···/ dt:ty is something less than
absolute impossibility.

The fact that public officers

have more important duties than the verification of
the records they have made is most often regarded
as sufficient to satisfy the necessity requirement.
5 Wigmore, Evidence§ 1631 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974).
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In addition, although counsel for the
appellant objected to the admission of the records
on the grounds of an insufficient showing of compliance with statute, and on the ground that an
insufficient chain of custody was established, no
objection was made to the introduction of the
evidence on the ground that an insufficient foundation had been laid for their admission under the
business records exception.

Appellant should not

be heard to complain for the first time on appeal
that an insufficient foundation was laid when no
such objection was presented in the juvenile court.
People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223
Cal. Rptr. 424

1

384 P.2d 16, 32

(1963) cert. denied 375 U.S. 994

(1964).

Respondents respectfully submit that the
juvenile court cownitted no error in admitting the
evidence on the foundation shown.
POINT IV
A CHAIN OF CUSTODY WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED
TO INSURE THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE FINGERPRINT CARD
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
Appellant has cited a number of cases involving
the admissibility of narcotics as evidence, and has
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stated that the "chain of custody" requirements
for that type of evidence is clearly analogous
to the case at bar.

The rationale for the chain

of custody requirement was specified by this
court in State v. Madsen, 28 U.2d 108, 498 P.2d
670 (1972), where it was stated that a physical
object or substance must be shown to be in substantially the same condition as at the time of the
criminal act before it would be admissible in a
court of law.

The court in that case propounded

the factors it would consider in determining
whether that showing had been made:

circumstances

surrounding the preservation and custody of the
object, ancl the likelihood of tampering.

Finally,

the CnLirt lwlc1 in Madsen that the determination
c1s t ,, 1.'lll'tl1,.r_- a sufficient chain of custody had been
establis~cd

w~s

in the first instance for the trial

court to make, and that such finding would not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.

All of the above factors undercut appellants

assignment of error.
First, an inked fingerprint card held in the
files of a police identification bureau is not even
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slightly analogous to narcotics evidence.

An

inked fingerprint can no more change over a period
of time so as to resemble another fingerprint
than an ink signature can cease to be unique.
Unlike a signature, a fingerprint cannot be forged.
An inked fingerprint card is not physical evidence,
but is essentially documentary in nature.

Docu-

ments do not need to be placed in sealed envelopes
to guarantee their integrity.

In addition to being

virtually impossible to create a spurious fingerprint, appellant has not demonstrated any credible
motive on the part of any individual who had access
to the records for attempting to do so.
si ttJL! ti on,
zero.

l

In this

lie likelihood of tampering is essentially

The circumstances surrounding the custody

of the card are equally unassailable.

As stated

above, the introduction of a fingerprint card
from official custody is held to be a sufficient
foundation to guarantee accuracy.
Utah Code Annotated

§

Polson, supra.

78-25-3 (1953), provides

that:
"Entries in public or other
official books or records, made
in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of this
state or by any other person in
the performance of a duty specially

-18-
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enjoined by the law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated
therein."
As stated above, the duty to take fingerprints is
specifically required by Utah Code Annotated
§§

77-59-9' 77-59-29 (1953).
Respondent is unaware of any authority

pertinent to the question of the appropriate chain
of custody requirement for fingerprint records,
but can suggest a more useful analogy than narcotics
evidence.
th~

There are a few cases that deal with

necessary chain of custody for latent finger-

prints to be admissible as evidence.
Viola,

Ohio

In State v.

, 82 N.E. 2d 306 the chain of

custody was held to be sufficiently shOWn even though
the evidence was not held in a sealed envelope.
In Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 208 S.E. 2d 791
(1974), the testimony of a police officer that the
prints never left r,olice custody was held sufficient
to establi'.oh a chain or custody, and in People v.
Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 'JG6, 105 P.2d 1, cert. denied
353 U.S. 930

(1957) it was held not error to admit

a latent fingerprint into evidence, even where it
had been left in an unlocked office without a showing
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how the fingerprint could have been forged or
that they had been tampered with.

The chain

of custody requirement for fingerprint records
was met and exceeded in the instant case.

As

Dean Wigmore has stated in 7 Wiqmore Evidence
(3d Ed. 1940)

§

2158:

"When in a government
office are kept permanent
records under the custody of
an officer appointed to that
duty, there is commonly little
danger in inferring that records
found there existing are genuine.
It would be difficult as well
as criminal to substitute or to
insert false records. Moreover, the usual mode of authenticating such documents (as by
proving the clerk's or officer's
handwriting) would be both highly
inconvenient, on account of its
repeated necessity, and also often
impossible, on account of the
change of officials as well as
the antiquity of many portions
of the records.
It seems, therefore, never
to hav• heen doubted that the
existe,,ce of an official document
in the crpropriate official custody
is sufficient evidence of its
genuinPness to go to the jury."
Respondent respectfully submits that the
juvenile court

corru~itted

no error in allowing the

fingerprint record into evidence.
POINT V
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DISMISSAL BECAUSE

THE EVIDENCE

WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT.
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Appellant contends that there is insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile courts verdict.
Respondent submits that a review of the record will
show the verdict to be amply supported.

It is

uncontested that the evidence indicates a burglary
and theft was committed on the date in question.
Uncontradicted evidence offered by the State established that the garage window was punched out and
placed inside the garage on the same date as the
burglarious entry.

(T.6).

Fingerprints were dis-

covered on the window on the day after the burglary
(T.14).

These prints were lifted and found con-

elusively to be those of the appellent (T.29).
The· .q>rclL1n t was unknown to the victim of the
bui•;\.11-y,
the

._111•\

1•re:;1~rw«

no evidence was offered to explain
of appellant's prints at the scene of

the crir11c.
The appropriate test to be applied in this
circumstance was discussed by this court in State v.
Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 cert. denied
355 U.S. 848

(1957):

"[l]
The defendants essay to
demonstrate that the evidence leaves
such doubt as to their identification
as the culprits in this crime that
they were entitled to a dismissal.
For them to prevail on that pro-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

position it must appear that,
viewing the evidence and all fair
inferences reasonably to be
drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict,
reasonable minds could not believe
them guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, but would necessarily entertain some substantial doubt of
their guilt ....
the practical
exigencies of crime detection and
prosecution are to reckoned with
and allowance made for the fact
that proof beyond all peradventure
of doubt could seldom be had.
Nor
does the law require it.
It is to
be borne in mind that most crimes,
and particularly burglary, are
committed with whatever stealth
and cunning the perpetrator can
devise to escape detection and
identification. All law enforcement officers and those victimized can do is to make such observations and piece together such
evidence as they are able to obtain
an~ if it warrants doing so, present
i• to courts and juries.
The
standard which must be met is only
that proof of guilt be established
l"'yond a reasonable doubt. Where
circumstances otherwise strongly
suggest guilt, the doubt should
be real and substantial and not one
that is merely possible or imaginary."
6 Utah 2d at 112, 114.
Respondent submits that the burden was met
in this case.
In State v. Washington, 17 Utah 2d 149, 405
P.2d 793 (1965) this court held that where fingerprint evidence was offered to connect a defendant
with a burglary, and no explanation is offered

-22-
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indicating anything other than guilt, the evidence
is sufficient to support a guilty verdict.
Hervey v. People, 495 P.2d 204

In

(Colo. 1972), the

court held that fingerprint evidence on a bottle
found near the scene of a murder is sufficient to
support a guilty verdict, where it appears that the
fact-finder was convinced that the fingerprints
were empressed at the time of the crime.

In State

v. Tew 234 N.C. 612, 688 S.E. 2d 291 (1951), where
fingerprint evidence was discovered on a piece of
glass inside a burglarized gas station, and the
attendant testified that she had never seen the
accused prior to the time of the crime, the evidence
was held sufficient to present a question for the
jury.

In State v. Hanna, l

Or. App. 110, 459 P.2d

564, the court held that where defendants

finger-

prints were found on a piece of glass located near
a broker

~indow,

th0 evidence was sufficient to

support the infercrce that defendant was the person
who entered the ha< ',c.
The fact that the fingerprint was found on
the garage window, and that there is no direct access
from the garage to the house does not undercut the
State's case.

In People v. Lyles, 156 Cal. App.
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2d 482, 319 P.2d 745 (1957), the court held that a
defendant found in an adjacent but unconnected
structure could be found guilty of attempted burglary.

Viewing the evidence and the inferences to

be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the verdict, the fingerprints on the garage
window were not so far removed from the admitted
burglary and theft in terms of either space or
time as to allow a reasonable doubt of the appellants
guilt.
Respondent respectfully submits that the
evidence was sufficient to justify the trier of
fact in finding the appellant guilty of burglary
and theft beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
Based on the facts, law and reasoning
set forth herein, the decision and order of the
Second District Ju'.'Pnile Court for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, conunitting Mr. Marquez to
the Utah State InC:u::trial School should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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